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LAw, in one view, is a formulated morality. It provides a system for deal-
ing with those members of society who have failed to fulfill moral obligations
which society requires for continued successful operation. In many instances,
this failure to conform to the prescribed social-moral code is associated with
personality disturbances. Explanation of the connection between personality
disturbances and moral deviation has become the domain of the psychiatrist.
In a recent book, Errors of Psychotherapy. Sebastian de Grazia has com-
mented on this psychiatric domain.
De Grazia's book was obviously intended to be "controversial." Even the
most casual reader will find it fulfills this intent. The book, in a theatrical,
religious style, attacks "modem psychotherapy" as ineffectual and organized
religion as inadequate. The author's arguments are based on the premise that
the basis of all mental disorder is a moral crisis. He suggests that all mental
patients are experiencing an inner feeling of wrongdoing, and it is this feel-
ing of wrongdoing which leads to anxiety and conflict. Such anxiety and con-
flict develop out of dilemmas of "good and bad" and of opposing "standards
and ideals" which the patient has and cannot by himself change. Selected
excerpts of well known psychological case histories are used exemplarily to
document this point of view.
The author considers the curative results of the various schools of psycho-
therapy. From the outset he demonstrates that there is a basic confusion as
to what cure actually is and that statistical reports of cures vary greatly, de-
pending on the source.
De Grazia's viewpoint is that for achieving cures the therapeutic technique
employed is not so important as the "doctor-patient" relationship. He em-
phasizes that whether the psychiatrist recognizes it or not he is an authority
figure by the very nature of the "doctor-patient" relationship. The author
argues that this authoritarian role is what is basic and crucial to healing; in
and of itself, it gives the therapist curative powers. The miraculous cures
achieved by the laying on of royal hands are cited as analogous examples to
substantiate this hypothesis.
De Grazia argues that the psychotherapist implicitly or explicitly gives
moral sanction even though he may be attempting to avoid this. The patient
responds to these moral sanctions administered by an authority figure of the
patient's social order; and so altered, he is reunited with his community (a
group of people with a common sense of right and wrong). Thus this cure is
basically akin to that of the sluznan, the witch doctor who by ritual transforma-
tion reunites the patient with his tribe. De Grazia insists, therefore, that the
cure of moral disorder (mental disease) can be effected only through moral
authority. This, he declares, is the basis of any and all successful cures. Psy-
chiatric treatment should present a moral authority who offers forgivene-s
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and a "right way" so that the patient not only can absolve his feeling of wrong-
doing, but can also be shown a path leading to the community of values which
is his social group.
The modem psychiatrist by no means strives to be a moral authority; he
avoids forgiveness and, in his love of "the scientific," dislikes concepts of mo-
rality. Therefore, any cures he obtains one must assume are accidental. Speci-
fically, de Grazia is of the opinion that: "In spite of superficial smartness,
modem psychotherapy, a hole-and-corner healing, is a failure."1
On the other hand, de Grazia finds in the religious practice of confession
much to -uphold. It is the therapy of "forgiveness" by the symbol of authority
as opposed to the modern psychotherapy of tolerance by an asocial outlander.
The fault of religion lies only in its laxity, which has let confession fall into
disuse. To quote de Grazia: "Modern religion, then, the house where people
might find God indwelling, is cold. Healing is dead in the modern church."2
The author summarizes his own point of view thus: "Universally, psycho-
therapy, as was shown, proceeds through the presentation of a moral problem
to a person of moral authority who offers moral guidance."8 The last phrase,
"who offers moral guidance," contains important additional ramifications:
"Therapy like any other science must proceed with an end in
view....
"[T]o be able to heal, to be able to say, 'This is the way you should
walk,' the therapist must see the man in the sunlight.... [T] he man
of ideal character, the one of whom it can be said, 'There is no one
more beautiful, more alive, more sympathetic, more reasonable, more
manly, or more perfect.'
"With this man in view therapy has foresight.... It has a scientific
norm by which to measure its work."
4
De Grazia is aware that this ideal man can be recognized as an "imitation
of a Christ."5 Congruent with this reasoning he believes that it is the task
of the political scientist together with the religious authority to draw up mea-
surements of the ideal man; with this ideal in mind, education will fashion
the children of the nation in its image. Thus, de Grazia offers a scheme for
preventive and reparative psychiatry both-a way to mold a healthy nation
and cure an unhealthy people.
De Grazia's sweeping generalizations should be considered objectively and
factually, not because of their intellectual value but because of their emotional









The basic premise of de Grazia's thesis is in error. His argument that in-
sanity is the province of moral leaders is based on the hypothesis that moral
disorders are the core of mental disease. The clinical evidence on this point
is obvious and quite definitive: the core of mental illness is not a moral con-
flict. First, guilt feeling are of no great importance in many significant mental
diseases: the overwhelming anxiety of the childhood schizophrenic is not based
on a moral conflict. The inferiority feelings of the character neurosis, the
dependent craving of the addict, the sexual anxiety of the homosexual and
the exhibitionist, the reactions of the paraplegic to his paralysis-none of these
problems is based on moral conflict or feelings of wrongdoing. Secondly,
when guilt is present, it does not evolve from an objective moral conflict. The
guilt feelings of the neurotic usually have no basis in any kind of social reality.
The neurotic guilt represents a distorted, sadistic, and unreasonable code not
to be found in real life. The neurotic in most cases has done nothing morally
wrong and there is nothing to forgive. The neurotic conflict is not simply be-
tween what is right and what is wrong. The anxiety which is responsible for
mental illness evolves out of the many complex relations men have with one
another; rightness and wrongness play only a small part in those relatiuns.
De Grazia's analysis of therapy is equally inadequate. He implies that sim-
ple confession is basic to psychotherapy. Yet most people who are suffering
from mental disease do not know what they should confess. The patient who
has a peptic ulcer cannot expain or confess the reasons for his ailment. Cathar-
sis does not come from telling the analyst what one knows; it comes from tell-
ing him what one does not know. All analytic techniques are aimed at helping
the patient discover rather than merely permitting him to confess.
De Grazia considers the beneficial therapist only as an authoritarian figure.
ignoring all the many subtleties of the so-called "transference relationship."
It is true that kings can heal but so can Florence Nightingales. Surely one
cannot say that the latter's "authoritarian role" is what is crucial to healing.
In similar ways much of what goes on in healing has been lightly overlooked
by de Grazia.
The most startling of de Grazia's suggestions is approximation to an ideal
man as the basis of prevention, cure, and measurement of cure. This is the
part of his thesis most unwise, most in error, and perhaps most dangerous.
Even the physician who deals with exact physical signs and symptoms has no
one standard, no one blood pressure, no one superb weight or height. The
patient is judged not on the basis of an ideal body but rather in terms of what
is best for his particular body. Similarly, the mentally ill person must be judged
not on his resemblance to other men but on his ability to find a place among
men. The absurd political and social implications of de Grazia's hypothesis
need no explication.
Clearly de Grazia's presentation resembles a dogmatic panacea rather than
a cool-headed analysis. Like all dogmatists de Grazia has overlooked many,
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of the facts; unlike most dogmatists he is not unaware of what has been over-
looked. Most of the arguments necessary to contradict his thesis are present
in his own text. They are presented, however, as if they were strong support-
ing arguments rather than contradictions. This technique is at times so ob-
vious as to be amusing or perhaps frightening.
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